











ABSTRACT: Based on various case studies, this article examines the
interaction of foreign investors and local operators in globalization in
the agro-food market in China. The study found that to break the
limitation of the high-end market and to position mainly in the middle
market were critical for international brands to succeed. Asian compa-
nies approached the China market as an insider because of cultural
proximity. The latter, plus focused management and effective technol-
ogy, made their operations proﬁtable easily, but also exposed them to
the risk of overexpansion. Quality products at affordable prices were the
catch-up approach adopted by local players. At the early stage of
globalization, winning tactics for local enterprises include imitating and
participating in foreign investments, and exploring the markets where
foreign investors have no advantages. In the China market, foreign and
domestic enterprises were competing, complementing, and collaborat-
ing with each other to allow each to achieve its goals. The study
analyzes the sophisticated relationships between domestic and foreign
players, and provides inputs to strategic discussions of foreign investors
and Chinese local enterprises about how to improve their competitive
positions.
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Danone Group, the world’s leading food company and based in France, has been
accelerating its international expansion since 1997. Emerging markets are the
focus of the expansion, and China is considered a strategic development area
(Danone Group Annual Report, 1999). In 2000, Danone’s sales in China reached
about EUR 1 billion, representing 7.5% of Danone Group’s global sales (Danone
Group’s Press Release, Paris, March 2, 2000). In China, Danone has become the
number-one player in the markets of bottled water, ﬂavored milk drinks, and
biscuits. Danone determined to raise China’s share in its global sales to 10% in
ﬁve years and to 20% in ten years (China Food Daily, 2001).
Danone is one of many foreign agro-food investors coming to China to conquer
this market with 1.3 billion consumers, in which demand for brand-name products
is fueled by a rise in disposable income, and the emergence of a middle class
seeking a nutritious, safe, and balanced diet. For multinationals, winning in China
means catapulting themselves into a position of global leadership; for regional
players, winning in China means earning world status. Nestle, Unilever, Kraft,
Continental, McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Budweiser, and Carlsberg are among
the former category, and President (Taiwan) and Charoen Pokphand (Thailand),
Sinar Mas (Indonesia), Kerry (Malaysia) are among the latter. However, winning
in China is not easy. Rapidly escalating competition, poor transportation infra-
structure, underdeveloped and fragmented distribution channels, scarcity of talent
and unwieldy joint venture relationships were recognized as major barriers for
success (Ayala and Lai, 1996). Recent literature has focused on advising foreign
investors about how to overcome these barriers, but has paid little attention to the
reactions of local ﬁrms. Actually, local reactions are important in emerging
markets where local industry’s growth and development are important to the
development of the overall domestic agrifood economy. Local agriculturally
related industry, from farming to food processing and retailing, provides needed
raw materials and services to foreign investors. Without the support of local
industries, foreign investors cannot operate. Local rival enterprises compete with
foreign investors. Their competition mirrors foreign investors’ errors in meeting
local tastes and in using local resources. Their competition joins that of foreign
investors to enlarge the pie of the emerging market of brand-name foods. Foreign
investors cannot develop without the competition of local enterprises. Moreover,
foreign investors need to prove they add value that beneﬁts local consumers and
to have helped the development of local economies, which are necessary
conditions for a friendly operating environment. Foreign investment is not
sustainable in a hostile environment.
This article examines interaction of foreign investors and local operators in the
process of globalization of the agro-food market in the People’s Republic of
China. Analyzing the sophisticated relationships between domestic and foreign
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Chinese local enterprises about how to improve their competition positions. That
discussion is timely for two reasons. First, there is a new wave of foreign
investment coming to China before China’s imminent entry into the WTO,
anticipated for the second half of 2001. Second, as Thompson and Cowan (2000)
observe, the Asian agro-food and ﬁber sector are in the early stages of
restructuring and globalization, but the ramiﬁcations of the process are as yet
unclear.
The paper proceeds as follows. The ﬁrst section describes foreign direct
investment (FDI) in China’s agro-food markets. The second and third sections
investigate competition strategies of multinational and Asian food companies,
respectively. The fourth section analyzes how domestic ﬁrms react to foreign
investors, and the last section summarizes the sophisticated interactions between
foreign and domestic agro-food enterprises.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA’S AGRO-FOOD SECTOR
Parallel with trade, FDI is an important market access vehicle in the globalization
process. As the second largest destination for FDI only after the United States,
China accumulated US$307.6 billion of FDI in 1999, the fruit of two decades of
an “open door policy” (China Statistical Yearbook, 2000). China’s manufacturing,
property, and utility sectors are principal targets of FDI; agriculture received only
1.76% of 1999s total FDI. However, greater interest was shown in the food-
processing sector, in which the presence of foreign investors is substantial. Table
1 shows that for the narrowly deﬁned food processing industry, which includes the
processing subsectors of grain, animal feed, edible oil, sugar, and animal protein,
in 1997 foreign enterprises accounted only for 6.2% in terms of the number of
enterprises, but about 20% in terms of output and value-added, and 31% in terms
of gross proﬁt. Compared with local enterprises, foreign ﬁrms were large in scale
and efﬁcient in operation.
In the packaged food industries, such as instant noodles, snack, milk powder,
and beverages, foreign investors exercise a larger inﬂuence. More than 100










Total 27871 46 9 1
Foreign 1728 10.1 1.8 0.3
Foreign Share 0.0621 0.22 0.19 0.31
*Food processing industry includes the sectors of grain processing, animal feed, edible oil, sugar, animal protein processing, and ﬁshery
processing.
Source: Wang, L. 2000. Report on Foreign Direct Investment in China. Page 201
Globalization in the Agro-Food Market in China 439foreign brands are operating in China’s beer market and occupy the premium
segment. The two Taiwanese companies alone, Tingyi and President, represent
about half of Chinese instant noodle sales. The bottled water market is led by two
Chinese enterprises, Wahaha and Robust; however, Danone has a controlling
stake in both. Coca Cola and Pepsi dominate the carbonated drink segment, and
their combined production constitutes almost half of total beverage sales. Foreign
brands of biscuits, chocolate, and ice cream are always the favorites of children.
McDonald’s and Kentucky Fried Chicken are the only nation-wide fast food
chains in China. In addition, Carrefour, Wal-Mart, and Metro are among top 10
food retail chains in China.
Widespread presence of foreign brands and investors seems to suggest an
overwhelming victory of foreign investors. However, if looking closely at the
market dynamics of many food segments, today’s achievements of foreign
investors come from long and difﬁcult struggles, gains, and losses. Along the way,
some foreign investors failed because of competition from other foreign brands
and increasingly competitive local players.
THE HIGH-END-MARKET TRAP:I NTERNATIONAL BRAND’S EXPERIENCES
Henderson (1998) analyzed the sources of competitive advantage in the processed
food industry in the context of globalization and found that the importance of the
endowment of natural resources is superseded by that of brand-related intellectual
property as the vehicle to carry multinational food companies’ products globally.
This has been true for many multinationals investing in China. For most food
multinationals who have entered China, their international brands acted as a key
to open the door of the China market (Rabobank International, 1995, 1999).
Famous foreign food brands, such as Nestle’s infant formula, Coca Cola’s soft
drinks, Unilever’s ice cream, and Carlsberg’s beer, were highly recognized for
their quality, associated lifestyle, and after-sale services when they were produced
and sold in the Chinese market. They were treated as premium brands at the
high-end market.
China’s consumer market can be divided into three segments: mass market,
value-for money-market, and high-end market. The high-end market might not be
the position that the international brands intended to be in the China market, since
they are widely sold in the mass market in developed economies. However, when
these brands came to China, their quality was much higher than that of local
products. To produce and maintain the brands cost much more than to produce
local products. Thus, international brand-name foods naturally fell into the
category of the high-end market in China.
The high-end market position at ﬁrst beneﬁted many international brands. High
prices were associated with high margins, and the sales were supported by a group
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new life, which make the draw of local products pale in comparison. However, not
all famous foreign brands had an immediate success when they were introduced
and ﬁrst produced in China. American breakfast cereals could not be accepted by
common consumers since they were too foreign to Chinese dietary habits.
Western high quality sausages were not tasty for most Chinese consumers who
prefer grandmother’s cooking. Hexter et al. (1998) noted that in the China market
the foreign food brands that were to create new categories of demand would face
more challenges in marketing than those which upgraded existing food categories.
In many cases, the halcyon days of famous foreign brands in China were but
brief. On the one hand, their high prices limited the further expansion of market
share. In the early 1980s, one can of Coca-Cola was sold at a price of RMB 3
(RMB is the Chinese currency, U.S.$1 5 RMB8.28 in 2000), equivalent to one
twentieth of an average worker’s monthly salary. Even in the 1990s, one tin of
Nestle’s infant formula was sold at a price equal to one ﬁfth of an average
worker’s monthly salary. On the other hand, their market shares were reduced by
competition from other famous international brands that followed the ﬁrst
entrants. In the China beer market in 1999, there were 28 made-in-China foreign
brands and 92 joint ventures. Together they represented 34.4% of total beer
production, amounting to 20.5 million tons, and 16.7% of the number of breweries
(Guo, 2000). Foreign brands are competing with each other in a narrow market
segment called the high-end market, representing less than 10% of total sales. It
was not surprising that more than 90% of international breweries lose money. The
CEO of Tsingdao Beer, a leading Chinese brewery, summarized the causes of
failure of many international brands as: high initial investment to build state-of-
the-art facilities, high management costs associated with expensive expatriates,
high marketing costs aiming at high-end consumers and using expensive media
channels, and high working capital costs for selling expensive beer in a small
market segment (Economic Daily, 2000).
More fatally, famous foreign brands themselves caused the emergence of
strong local rivals in some cases. Foreign direct investors, via joint ventures or
wholly-owned enterprises, set new quality standards, illustrated marketing inno-
vations, introduced new products and technology, introduced new management
concepts, and expanded the international market for “Made in China” food
products. Local companies learned and mastered these gradually. Although many
local food companies lost in the competition, some arose from ashes and became
threatening rivals to foreign brands. In almost all subsectors of agro-food industry,
there are now strong local companies matching foreign companies. Table 2 lists
the selected pairs in various agro-food markets. These local enterprises improved
product quality and services and created their own brands. However the prices of
their products are perhaps only half of that of international brands. They squeezed
the space of the high-end market enjoyed by famous international brands.
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In a sense, then, the high-end market turned into a trap for foreign food
companies. What is the way out for international brands? A continuation of the
strong development of China’s economy will partially solve the problem. During
1985 through 1999, China’s GDP grew 10.1% annually, and average wage/salary
of workers and employees rose about sevenfold (China Statistical Yearbook,
2000). In 1985, an upper-middle-class family could not afford Nestle infant
formula, but they could 15 years after (an average family still could not).
Similarly, buying a can of Coca Cola worth RMB 3 was a big decision 15 years
ago, but not anymore. Economic growth enlarged client bases for international
brands.
However, the pace of economic growth cannot match the demand needs of
some international brands which have big investments. A very large production
facility without a strong customer base cannot meet ﬁnancial liabilities, and
cannot tolerate a long period of losing money. Many failed foreign investors
simply withdrew. Recent important events were the sale by Kraft of their dairy
operation to their Chinese partner Sanyuan for US$ 9.3 million (China Food
Daily, 2001), and the sale by Carlsberg of 75% of their brewery in Shanghai to
Tsingdao for U.S.$ 18 million (Economic Daily, 2000).
Among the survivors or winners among companies with international brands,
some worked in the direction of reducing their costs and lowering prices, and
allowed their products and brands to step down from the high-end market to the
value-for-money or even the mass market segment. Unilever sharply cut the prices
of their ice cream in 1999 to compete with local brands, particularly Yili.
Table 2 Rejected Foreign and Domestic Competitors in Various Chinese
Agro-food Markets
Sector Foreign Domestic
Beer Budweiser, Carlsberg, South
Africa Breweries
Tsingdao, Yanjin, Zhujiang
Carbonated Drinks Coca Cola, Pepsi Wahaha, Jianlibao
Bottled Water Tingyi, President Wahaha, Robust
Milk Added Drinks Danone, Want Want Wahaha, Robust, Shanghai Bright
Milk Powder Nestle, New Zealand Dairy
Board, Wyeth
Sanlu, Yili, Shanghai Bright
Ice Cream Uniliver, Maintain-Cream Yili, Shanghai Bright
Yoghurt Kraft, Danone Shanghai Bright, Beijing Sanyun
Instant Noodle Tingyi, President, Sinar Mas Meichu, Fumanduo
Feed and Poultry Chareon Pokphand, Continental,
Cargill
Hope, Tongwei
Edible oil Sinar Mas, Kerry Luhua, Shanghai Edible Oil
Food Retail Carrefour, Wal-Mart, Metro Lianhua, Hualian, Suguo
Meat Processing Homel Shuanghui, Yurong, Chundou
Fast Food McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken Ronghuaji, Malan Lamian
Source: Rabobank International Database.
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their costs and consumer prices were rising. During 1997–1999, their sales rose
10.63% annually, but the sale prices fell 7.82% annually (China Food Daily,
2000). The price controls or reductions were made possible because of economies
of scale, the right strategy, and tight management.
Reducing prices might compromise the quality and the image of certain
international brands. An alternative path followed by some international compa-
nies was to develop local brands and sell at competitive prices. Their original
brands remain at the original price level. Some international breweries acquired
and produced some local brands for the mass market. Either by introducing their
own local brands or acquiring local brands, international agro-food companies are
getting out of the high-end-market trap.
Another approach is to maintain and increase the value of international brands,
differentiating them greatly from local brands. McDonald’s position is far from
the high-end market in developed economies. However, dining in McDonald’s in
China is still a luxury, since the price of RMB 15 to 20 per meal is a big number
for the monthly income of RMB 500 of an average worker. There is little room
for McDonald’s to reduce price without hurting the quality of food and services.
McDonald’s practices the operational rules closely, and provides food and
services of the same quality no matter when and where customers are dining. This
is a sharp contrast to Chinese restaurants where even the same dish at the same
restaurant will taste differently if the cook differs.
FOREIGN COMPANY BUT LOCAL BRAND:A SIAN COMPANIES’S TRATEGY
Multinational food companies are the ﬁrst-tier investors in China’s agro-food
markets with globally known brands, advanced technology, and great ﬁnancial
strength. Regional or Asian agro-food companies are the second tier, with weaker
positions if compared with multinationals, but much stronger if compared with
local ﬁrms. Typically they adopted a different strategy to approach the China
market, that is, emphasizing the localities of their products and services rather
than non-Asian images.
Among Asian food companies in China, Japanese food companies typically
focus on manufacturing products for exporting to the Japanese food market. The
agro-food companies run by ethnic Chinese from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Taiwan are among the most successful and inﬂuential. In the China market,
the food processing and beverage industries absorbed the largest amounts of
Taiwanese manufacturing investment capital, just next to the rubber industry (Fei,
1996). Taiwanese investors have penetrated all ﬁelds of Mainland China’s food
value chain. Tingyi, Want Want, and President are three leaders with dominant
market positions in many categories. Each of them has invested more than U.S.$
Globalization in the Agro-Food Market in China 443300 million in mainland China, and treats the mainland market as its focus market.
As Taiwan’s dominant food company, President plans to climb to the peak of
international leadership by winning in the mainland market (Wei, 2000).
The success of Taiwanese agro-food enterprises is well illustrated by the rise
of Tingyi Group. Tingyi Group created an instant noodle brand, Master Kang, in
the city of Tianjin, China in 1992, after several failed investment trials in the
edible oil and snack food business. Then the imported instant noodles were sold
at RMB 5 per bag, but local products were sold only at RMB 0.4 per bag. The
middle market was empty. Tingyi ﬁlled the gap with the value-for-money product
at RMB 1 to 2 per bag. Tingyi named the product Master Kang, since the term of
“Master” was commonly used in the mainland to greet respectable professionals,
and “Kang” can be a family name, but also means health. Taste tests of the noodle
were performed many times by 1000 persons before being ﬁnalized. Master Kang
was an instant noodle product with a local name and a local taste but with greatly
improved quality. It shocked the market when it was ﬁrst introduced (Zhang,
2000). The market share of Master Kang has been above 30% since then, and
remained at 32.78% in 1999 even after many new players had entered the market
(Commercial Information Center of State Internal Trade Bureau, 2000). Tingyi
group’s business today goes far beyond instant noodles, and includes beverages,
dairy, ﬂour, retail, fast food, and snacks.
The most successful operations of Taiwanese investors concentrate on ‘ready-
to-eat’ products and beverages. This reﬂects a unique advantage over other
foreign investors that Taiwanese food companies enjoy—a thorough understand-
ing of Chinese tastes and preferences. Typically, Taiwanese food companies’
initial investments are practical, without an addiction to state-of-the-art technol-
ogies. Their management is inexpensive since their expatriates need a smaller
package to compensate for hardship in China if compared with their Western
counterparts. And they treat the mainland as an immediate and major revenue
source. Geographical proximity allows their headquarters to closely manage the
operations. By contrast, for many multinationals the China market competes for
attention with other emerging markets and is considered a far-away market. As a
result, Taiwanese investors can place a signiﬁcant distance between themselves
and industry competitors, both Western and local companies. Their products are
not shelved in the high-end market waiting for rich consumers, but compete with
local products in the segment of the value-for-money, or even the mass market.
Although Taiwanese operations are local in the sense of branding and
marketing, they maintain distinctions—the Taiwanese ﬁrms never give up the
controlling majority to mainland partners, and they set up wholly-owned
operations whenever possible. On many occasions, expatriates tightly control
management and Mainland Chinese locals are rarely in top positions.
The approach of Thailand’s Charoen Pokphand group (CP) has been very
different. Most of CP’s investment in China is in joint ventures, and CP adopted
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respond to China’s open-door policy and invested in 1979. After 20 years with
more than U.S. $4 billion investment, CP had 173 companies in China with
agroindustry being its core, including more than 100 feed mills in 29 of China’s
31 provinces. CP’s performance, particularly in agroindustry, has been successful
although there were difﬁculties during the Asian crisis. CP holds about 10% of
China’s feed market (www.cpthailand.com).
A Harvard Business School case study (Urban and Wertz, 1995) identiﬁed that
a critical piece of CP’s strategy in China is to approach the market, not as an
outsider, but as a Chinese company using outside resources to improve the
country’s economy. CP’s identity as a Chinese company was established via a
systematic approach. The four key elements of this approach were building up
trust with local partners, localizing management, transferring technology readily,
and sharing proﬁts generously.
Because the feed business is not technology-driven and has to deal with
numerous buyers and suppliers in the China context, CP spent enormous effort to
build up trust with joint venture partners by individual interactions. Such trust
evolved into personal connections called guanxi in Chinese. In a place or a
process where there were no set rules, guanxi was about writing the rules as you
move along with your partners. Guanxi was certainly incompatible with Western
culture. Whereas CP maintained control over the joint-venture companies, CP
tried to localize management, using locals rather than Thai expatriates to represent
CP. CP provided technology not only to its joint venture partners, but also to the
market it served. This was contrary to the practices of many Western companies
that overestimate the proprietary nature of certain pieces of their technology. CP’s
joint venture structure ensured that local partners would always receive deserved
economic beneﬁts, which was different from typical Western negotiation prac-
tices. This practice allowed CP to be accepted not only by the market, but also by
the Chinese governments at various levels.
In contrast with the initial strategy of multinational agrofood companies, that is,
high-end-market brands and high margins, many Asian companies entered the
China market with local brands or emphasized the brands’ local origins. The
image of their brands might not be as high as that of international brands, but the
products won the market quickly and widely. However, emphasizing local origins
does not mean compromising brand equities. Asian investors still need to create
a distance from local brands in terms of product quality, after-sale services, and
marketing. Not all Asian companies can achieve this. Some Taiwanese food
companies suffered the same drawback as some multinational food companies
did. They either liquidated equity or converted the facilities for other uses (China
Time, 2001).
Asian agro-food companies’ cultural advantage, compared with Western
companies, brings them early success in the market, but also brings the risk of
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Asian agro-food company acquired a major food company in their home market
in 1997, using their proﬁts from the China market. However, intense competition
in the China market and the Asian ﬁnancial crisis damaged its cash position. It had
to sell a large share of its holdings to a Japanese company. CP had to sell its
noncore business in China to strengthen its ﬁnancial position as well during 1997
through 1999 because they were stretched too thin, at least ﬁnancially.
Fundamentally, the corporate governance of many Asian agro-food enterprises
has not broken away from the strong tradition of family business. Risk manage-
ment, technology innovation, and adapting the organizational structure to changes
in business environment is not adequate to allow the sustainable development of
many ﬁrms. That partially explains Hexter et al.’s (1998) ﬁnding that, in China’s
packaged food market, Asian companies are almost twice as likely as multina-
tionals to achieve a minimum threshold return on invested capital during their ﬁrst
four years of operation—but are only fractionally more likely to experience
success later.
QUALITY PRODUCTS AT AFFORDABLE PRICES:L OCAL PLAYERS’C ATCH-
UP STRATEGY
The initial position of domestic producers was in the mass market when foreign
investors ﬁrst came. At that time, the quality gap was enormous. Foreign brands
were associated with high quality and a new lifestyle, and domestic brands
represented outdated tastes and ignorance toward consumers. In the 1980s, on
retail shelves, some famous foreign brands’ whole-fat milk powder in 250 g
plastic bags was sold at the price about RMB 20 to 25, whereas similar domestic
products were sold at RMB 5 or less. Consumers worried about the sanitation
standards of the domestic product and the true source of their raw materials
(whether it was raw milk or soybean powder). They would buy the imported or
foreign brands whenever their budgets permitted. In 1999, there were 45
foreign-capital dairy manufacturers out of 378 in the country (China Dairy
Industry Association, 2000). A large number of domestic dairy players, unable to
adapt to intensiﬁed competition from Nestle and other international brands, exited
the market.
Domestic ﬁrms were both shocked and inspired. In the milk powder market,
famous foreign brands’ quality standards began to be observed, their management
and equipment were duplicated, and their marketing practices were imitated. Over
time, a group of domestic players emerged with reputable products and brands. By
the late 1990s, whereas the same famous foreign brands were sold at the same
price as 10 years ago (RMB 20–25), the newly strengthened domestic brands
were sold at RMB 10 to 15. On the rebound, these Chinese dairy companies are
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recently, Danone Group sold their two dairy operations to Shanghai Bright—the
leading Chinese dairy company. One reason was that Danone Group could not
compete with Shanghai Bright in the yogurt market, even though sometimes
Danone priced its products lower than Shanghai Bright’s did. Instead of directly
running the operations to compete with Shanghai Bright, Danone Group turned
over the Danone brands to Shanghai Bright to manage, and Danone became a 5%
shareholder of Shanghai Bright. Danone’s strategy is to use Shanghai Bright to
develop China’s dairy market and one day to become a major shareholder (China
Food Daily, 2000).
While international brands remained in the high-end market, domestic players
could adopt foreign technology and management to upgrade their operations and
to create the value-for-money brands. However, over time some multinationals
with international brands created economies of scale and localized their opera-
tions—and stepped down from the high-end market and to join the middle or
mass-market competition. Coca-Cola practiced this strategy. Allied with China
National Cereals, Oils, & Foodstuffs Import & Export Corporation (COFCO),
Kerry and Swire (Hong Kong), Coca-Cola developed a 25-plant network covering
all of mainland China. Coca-Cola controls only two concentrate production plants
and focuses on marketing and distribution, leaving bottling to its powerful
partners. When Coca-Cola and Pepsi prospered in the China market in the 1980s,
there were numerous domestic beverage companies led by eight large ﬁrms to
compete with the foreign giants. However, not long after that, seven out of the
eight leading domestic companies were out of business, and were either sold to the
two giants, became processors of foreign brand products, or closed down (Chen,
1999). In 1997, 22% of China’s beverages were produced by Coca-Cola and Pepsi
(China Light Industry Yearbook, 1998).
The growth of the domestic beverage enterprises was directed by the pressure
of Coca-Cola and Pepsi to the markets of noncarbonated drinks, such as
fruit/vegetable juice, bottled water, and recently, tea drinks and large-container
drinking water for family and ofﬁce use, where there were no strong foreign
competitors. Wahaha and Robust were the main ﬁrms among domestic beverage
producers. Established in the late 1980s, both were inspired and inﬂuenced by
Coca-Cola and Pepsi’s management practices, advertisement, and distribution
methods, and creatively built up their own brand equity over time. They both were
good at identifying the market potential of certain beverage categories. Wahaha,
which means “laughing kids,” introduced ﬂavored milk drinks to serve the needs
of millions of children at whom beverage ﬁrms had no dedicated beverage to
target. Robust, whose Chinese name means cheering up everybody, marketed
bottled water to address consumers’ concerns about widespread water pollution,
and to meet the needs of a prospering tourist industry. The sense of market
development of this type was not the advantage of foreign beverage companies.
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approach. For example, Wahaha took advantage of the government’s poverty
alleviation program and used state funds to set up bottling facilities in poor
regions. The approach of this type could not be copied by foreign investors.
Together, in 1998, they represented 35% of the national favored milk drink
market, and 29% of the national bottled water market (Commercial Information
Center of State Internal Trade Bureau, 2000). Interestingly enough, after accu-
mulating enough commercial strength, Wahaha entered the carbonated drink
market, and directly competed with Coca-Cola and Pepsi. In 1999, its carbonated
drink production reached 500,000 metric tons, about one third of that of Coca
Cola’s production in China (Rabobank International, 2000).
The development of the Chinese feed industry demonstrated another pattern, in
which foreign investors led by CP pioneered a new industry and domestic
companies grew up side-by-side with foreign investors. Domestic companies
closely followed foreign companies and imitated almost all aspects of foreign
companies’ practices. The process is characterized by the development of Hope
Group—a privately owned Chinese feed company.
In the late 1980s, Hope entered the feed business, since their home province
raised about one-ﬁfth of the pigs in China, about 70 million head. They closely
imitated CP’s technology, management, and marketing. In addition, Hope
recruited some professional staff from the group CP. Their competitive strategy
was simple—undercut the Thai company’s price because their investment and
costs were lower. In addition, they knew the local market better. Hope went on to
exceed CP’s sales in Sichuan province, and then set up 90 operations all over the
country. In 1997, Hope accounted for 5% of the whole country’s compound feed
sale with 2.5 million tons (Erickson and Mooney, 1998), when CP’s market share
was 10% (Annual Report of Chareon Pokphand Group, 1997).
The three observed competitive strategies of Chinese agro-food companies are:
(1) learning from foreign investors and upgrading the products from mass to
middle market; (2) developing in the markets where foreign competitors have not
entered or have no advantages; (3) imitating foreign investors. In practice these
approaches may be used by the same company according to the context, each of
them might be emphasized by different industries according to characteristics of
the industry, and also adopted by different regions according to economic
development levels. In competition with foreign enterprises, domestic agro-food
enterprises have advantages in understanding consumer preferences, having
support from governments, and accessing inexpensive resources from raw
materials to human capital to assets. Domestic enterprises are typically weak in
corporate governance, which results from vaguely deﬁned property ownership, an
irregular market environment, and inadequate human resources.
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Famous international brands can be the key for multinational food companies to
open the door to the China market, but cannot guarantee their success in that
market. They must utilize their intellectual resources to adapt their brands to the
China market.
Kentucky Fried Chicken established “KFC China Committee of Health Food”
in China to adapt the tastes of its fried chicken to Chinese consumers, and
developed a soup dedicated to China (Jiang, 2000). McDonald’s is less ﬂexible in
changing the taste of its meals, but opens air-conditioned stores in hot summer to
allow high school students to prepare admission examinations to universities, and
provide free services of selling monthly bus passes. Via the approach, Mc-
Donald’s tried to become a member of local community rather than a high-end
restaurant. While there is little chance to change the secret formula of Coca Cola
to ﬁt local taste preferences, Coca Cola introduced a new package with the image
of a traditional Chinese doll to celebrate Chinese Lunar New year in 2001 (China
Food Daily, 2001).
More fundamentally, multinationals formed alliances with local ﬁrms and used
local ﬁrms’ advantages to penetrate the Chinese market, such as in the case of
Coca Cola. At one extreme, multinationals recognized their limitations in the
Chinese market, and acquired local companies to produce local brands in local
ways. Danone acquired the majority stake of Chinese beverage giants Wahaha and
Robust in 1996 and 2000, respectively. Danone left the management to the
original teams and no Danone’s brands were added to the operations—the original
local brands were the only focus.
While Asian food companies are approaching the market from the inside, they
also draw strength from international resources. CP’s ﬁrst joint venture in China
was ﬁrmed with Continental, and CP’s partner in the U.S., Avian, provided
critical technology support for its poultry business in China. The Taiwanese
instant noodle giant Tingyi teamed up with Japanese noodle producer Sunyo to
strengthen its position in China.
Some Chinese agro-food enterprises developed and prospered in the market
segment where foreign competitors are weak. Shuanghui is the market leader in
the meat processing industry, and is ﬁrmly owned and managed by local Chinese
in the middle of the country. However, this did not prevent the group from
forming more than 20 joint ventures with numerous foreign investors, which
allowed Shuanghui to upgrade technology, management, and ﬁnancial strength
(Economic Daily, 2000). Some Chinese ﬁrms teamed up with foreign partners as
equal partners to explore the potential of Chinese market, such as when China
Resources Enterprise and South African Breweries formed a joint venture and
upgraded local beer brands and prospered in the middle, not high-end, market. In
these cases, strong Chinese companies won the competition with foreign
Globalization in the Agro-Food Market in China 449enterprises, bought the assets, and began producing international brands on behalf
of the multinationals.
A single and simple formula does not exist for foreign agro-food companies to
compete with local players, nor for local companies to compete with foreign
ﬁrms. For multinational companies, the limitations of the high-end market should
be fully recognized. Increasing affordability and acceptance of the products and
using the assistance of local enterprises are key parts of a competitive strategy for
multinational companies in China. For Asian agro-food companies, easy entry
success cannot guarantee continued prosperity, and in many agro-food markets,
the time of easy entry is over and competition is intense. To convert family
businesses into modern corporations is a big challenge.
The impacts of globalization, or the impacts of joining the WTO, could be
disastrous to certain agro-food enterprises or industries in the near future.
However, 20 years of an “open door” in China’s agro-food markets have seen the
emergence of many strong domestic ﬁrms. Domestic ﬁrms need to be innovative
to meet the challenges from foreign enterprises. Identifying the market where
foreign enterprises have no advantages, using foreign resources to upgrade
operations from that of mass market to value for money or even high-end market,
forming equity alliances with foreign ﬁrms to get direct access to foreign
resources and markets—these are among the key success factors in the context of
globalization.
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